This study examines the effect of investor sentiment on the accruals anomaly. We find that for small stocks mispricing per unit of accruals is greater in high sentiment periods as compared with low sentiment periods. This result is consistent with the notion that in high sentiment periods individual investors pay less attention toward understanding the accruals and cash flow components of earnings. This effect is observed primarily for small stocks because these stocks are more likely to be followed by individual investors, who tend to have limited attention. We also find that for small stocks reported accruals are greater during high sentiment periods as compared with low sentiment periods, suggesting that managers exploit the greater overvaluation per unit of accruals during high sentiment periods.
Introduction
documents a negative relation between accruals and future returns. He explains that investors are fixated on net income and therefore treat cash flow and accrual components of accounting earnings to be equally value relevant when in fact the cash flow component has greater implication for future earnings. This causes accruals to be overvalued initially and the market price correction occurs in the future years. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2006) argue that the fixation by investors on reported earnings is due to a psychological constraint called limited attention. It is costly to devote time and attention to understand the available information. Thus, some investors with limited resources value a stock based only on a subset of publicly available information.
More specifically, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2006) argue that a firm discloses both earnings and cash flows. Investors with limited attention and processing power may select to focus on only one of the measures, which is more informative of firm value, and hence they choose earnings. The lack of attention to the accruals and cash flow components of earnings leads to the overvaluation of accruals. Moreover, professional investors who are likely to pay full attention to the earnings components are risk averse and given that arbitrage is risky they do not completely exploit mispricing caused by the limited-attention investors. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2006) further argue that equilibrium stock price is likely to be a function of the weighted average of the beliefs of investors with different levels of investor attention, with weights being the proportion of investors in each investor group.
Limited attention is an important concept for understanding stock market misreaction to accounting information as well as firms' information disclosure and financial reporting behavior Teoh [2003, 2006] ). Yet, only limited evidence exists on the validity of this concept. A few experimental studies document the effect of limited attention on how investors interpret accounting data (see Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson [2002] for a review). Empirical evidence on this issue exists only in the form of greater misreaction to accounting information, specifically, quarterly earnings announcements and accruals, for stocks that are followed by more individual investors as against professional investors (Bartov, Krinsky, and Radhakrishnan [2000] ; Collins, Gong, and Hribar [2003] ). In this study, we provide additional empirical evidence on the effect of limited investor attention on stock market misreaction to accounting accruals by using a different measure to capture limited attention.
We argue that investors' attention is lower in high sentiment periods, which are periods in which noise investors overestimate the expected returns of stocks (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler [1991] ). During these periods, individual investors tend to be more active (Baker and Stein [2004] ; Karlsson, Lowenstein, and Seppi [2005] ; Liu [2006] ) and hence the limited attention effect is expected to be greater. Also, in high sentiment years, individual investors are optimistic about future stock performance. Thus, they are less likely to worry about losses they might incur from mispricing due to the limited attention they put toward understanding the accruals and cash components of earnings. These same losses may be viewed as important in low sentiment years, when individual investors are pessimistic about the future stock performance. Thus, in low sentiment years, they are likely to pay more attention to the earnings components. 1 We predict that for small stocks mispricing per unit of accruals is greater in high sentiment years than in low sentiment years.
For our analysis, we employ the investor sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) . This index captures the common variation in the various investor sentiment proxies identified in the literature, namely, the closedend fund discount, share turnover, average first day initial public offering returns, number of initial public offerings, share of equity issues in total debt and equity issues, and the dividend premium. Moreover, following Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) , we use firm size as a proxy for proportionate ownership by individual investors as against professional investors.
2 We find that mispricing per unit of accruals for small stocks is higher in high sentiment years than in low sentiment years. This result is consistent with the notion that, in high sentiment periods, individual investors tend to be more active and also pay less attention toward understanding the earnings components, leading to a greater accruals mispricing.
We also find that, for small stocks, the accrual component of earnings tends to be greater in high sentiment years than in low sentiment years. This result is consistent with the notion that managers exploit greater overvaluation per unit of accruals in high sentiment years by reporting greater accruals in those years. The assumption here is that managers like their stocks to be overvalued, even though the overvaluation is temporary and would subsequently get corrected when accruals reverse. Such temporary overvaluation can have a favorable impact on managers' compensation (e.g., if they exercise their stock options when the stocks are overvalued) or the value of their ownership in the company (e.g., if they acquire other companies using the overvalued stocks).
This study makes the following contributions. First, our result that for small stocks mispricing per unit of accruals is greater during high sentiment periods as compared with low sentiment periods corroborates the conclusions of prior theoretical and empirical studies that stock market misreactions to accounting information is due to limited investor attention (Bartov, Krinsky, and Radhakrishnan [2000] ; Collins, Gong, and Hribar [2003] ; Teoh, [2003, 2006] ;). Given that the concept of limited attention and investor misreaction to accounting information has been examined in the literature using only one measure of investor limited attention, namely, proportion of ownership by individual investors, there is a concern that some unknown confounding factors may be driving the results of prior studies. Thus, by using a different measure to capture the limited attention construct, we increase confidence in the theoretical and empirical conclusions about the effect of limited attention of investors on stock market misreaction to accounting information. Moreover, prior studies have identified several cross-sectional determinants of accruals mispricing, primarily related to 2. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler's (1991) observation that small stocks tend to have greater proportion of individual investors is also valid for recent years. Specifically, we find that percentage ownership by institutional investors is greater for large stocks than for small stocks in every year from 1988 to 2003. Thus, the notion that small stocks are more susceptible to noise trader sentiment is likely to be applicable to our sample period. Note that percentage ownership by institutional investors of small stocks has increased over time, suggesting that the susceptibility of small stocks to noise trader sentiment is likely to have reduced over time. However, the difference in institutional ownership of large stocks and the institutional ownership of small stocks has also increased over time. Thus, the susceptibility to noise trader sentiment of small stocks relative to that of large stocks is unlikely to have reduced by much over time.
investor sophistication and arbitrage costs. Conversely, this study identifies an important time-series determinant of accruals mispricing.
Second, our result that, for small stocks, reported accruals are greater during the high sentiment periods as compared with the low sentiment periods corroborates the conclusions of prior studies (e.g., Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1998a, 1998b] ) that managers use accounting discretion to exploit investors' limited attention for understanding the earnings components. Moreover, prior studies provide this evidence in a cross-sectional setting, specifically, new equity issuance; this study, on the other hand, provides this evidence in a time-series setting.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we define our data sources and variables. In particular, we discuss the sentiment measure in detail. In Section 3, we discuss our research design and present our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Data
We obtain company financial data from the Compustat annual database and stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly stock returns files. Our sample covers all firm-years with available data on Compustat and CRSP for the period . It consists of all U.S. firms except for (1) financial and utility firms (4900 SIC 4999 and 6000 SIC 6999), (2) firms with negative book value of equity, and (3) firms with book-tomarket values within the top and bottom 1 percent. Firm-years with year-end stock prices below $5 are deleted to reduce the effect of microstructure-induced return volatility (Conrad and Kaul [1993] ; Loughran and Ritter [1996] ).
Accruals Measures
We use two measures of accruals: total accruals and current accruals. The first measure, Total Accruals, is calculated as (DCA À DCash) À (DCL À DSTD À DTP) À DEPEXP scaled by lagged assets, where DCA equals change in current assets (data4 of Compustat), DCash equals change in cash and cash equivalents (data1), DCL equals change in current liabilities (data5), DSTD equals change in short-term debt (data34), and DTP equals change in taxes payable (data71), and DEPEXP equals depreciation and amortization expense (data14). Market value of equity is measured as year-end stock price (data199) times the number of shares outstanding (data25). Book-to-market ratio is measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity (data60) Current Accruals are measured as (DCA À DCash) À (DCL À DSTD À DTP) scaled by lagged assets. The motivation for using current accruals for the tests of accruals mispricing is provided by Sloan (1996) , who shows that the accruals mispricing is driven primarily by current accruals. Furthermore, the motivation for using current accruals for the tests of accruals management is provided by Beneish (1998) and Thomas and Zhang (2000) , who argue that there is more management of current accruals than there is of noncurrent accruals. They note that managing earnings via depreciation is potentially transparent, because changes in estimates that alter depreciation expense are disclosed in footnotes. Also, timing capital expenditures for earnings management purposes could be costly because such timing may reduce foregoing profitable investment opportunities Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of Total Accruals and Current Accruals, both normalized using the beginning of the year total assets as the deflator. We do not use average total assets as the deflator, because accruals are mechanically related to ending total assets. The results, however, do not depend on this normalization. We also report descriptive statistics of the market value of equity, the book-to-market ratio, and returns of the prior six months, which are additional explanatory variables in our analysis
Sentiment Measures
Prior work suggests several proxies for investor sentiment. Given the lack of consensus on which measure is the best, Baker and Wurgler (2006) advocate a composite measure of sentiment. Their proposed measure of sentiment is based on the common variation in the following previously identified proxies: (1) the Note: Total Accruals is measured as (DCA À DCash) À (DCL À DSTD À DTP) À DEPEXP, scaled by lagged assets, where DCA ¼ change in current assets; DCash ¼ change in cash and cash equivalents; DCL ¼ change in current liabilities; DSTD ¼ change in short-term debt; DTP ¼ change in tax payable; and DEPEXP ¼ depreciation and amortization expense.
Current Accruals are measured as (DCA À DCash) À (DCL À DSTD À DTP), scaled by lagged assets.
Market value of equity is measured as year-end stock price times the number of shares outstanding. Book-to-Market ratio is measured as book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. PriorRet is the cumulative stock return of six months preceding the future return measurement period. The sample includes all U.S. firms between 1962 and 2004 with the required variables to calculate Total Accruals and Current Accruals, except for financial and utility firms (4900 SIC 4999 and 6000 SIC 6999), firms with negative book value of equity, and firms with book-to-market (BM) values in the top and bottom 1 percent.
closed-end fund discount, (2) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) share turnover, (3) the number of initial public offerings (IPOs), (4) average first-day returns of IPOs, (5) the equity share in new equity and debt issues, and (6) the dividend premium. Below, we briefly describe these sentiment proxies, the motivation behind their inclusion, and how the sentiment index is constructed
Closed-End Fund Discount
Closed-end fund discount is measured as the value-weighted average difference between the net asset values and the market prices of the shares of closedend stock funds. Prior studies suggest a negative relation between sentiment and closed-end fund discount. Zweig (1973) shows that the discount can predict returns of the Dow Jones index. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) show that both closed-end funds and small stocks tend to be held by individuals and that the discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stock do well, suggesting that both classes of assets are being affected by sentiment of individual investors
NYSE Share Turnover
NYSE share turnover is measured as the ratio of trading volume to average shares outstanding. Baker and Stein (2004) suggest that share turnover increases with investor sentiment. They argue that in the presence of short-sales constraints, irrational investors participate when they are optimistic, which in turn increases turnover. Consistent with this argument, Jones (2001) finds that high turnover forecasts low market returns
First-Day Returns on IPOs
First-day returns on IPOs are measured as the average first-day returns on IPOs. This measure is argued to be positively correlated with investors' sentiment (Ritter [1991] )
Number of IPOs
The number of IPOs is measured as the total number of IPOs during a calendar year. This measure is also argued to be positively correlated with investor sentiment (Ritter [1991] ). Managers are likely to time the issuance of IPOs when the investor sentiment is high and investors are likely to overvalue equity
The Share of Equity Issues in Total Equity and Debt Issues
The share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues is expected to be positively associated with investor sentiment. As mentioned before, managers are likely to turn to issuance of equity when the investor sentiment is high and investors overvalue equity. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that high values of this factor predict low market returns
Dividend Premium
Dividend premium is measured as the log difference of the average marketto-book ratios of payers and nonpayers. This measure is negatively related to investor sentiment. This measure captures investor demand for dividend paying stocks. Because dividend paying stocks are considered to be safety stocks, investors would pay premium for such stocks in low sentiment periods Baker and Wurgler (2006) use principal components analysis to isolate the common component across the above sentiment proxies. They also consider the relative timing of the sentiment proxies-that is, some proxies may reflect a given shift in sentiment earlier than others. For example, IPO volume lags the first-day returns on IPOs. Baker and Wurgler (2006) also consider that certain sentiment proxies may capture common business-cycle variation. For example, the number of IPOs varies with the business cycle in part for rational reasons. To control for the business cycle effects, Baker and Wurgler regress each of the six proxies on (1) growth in the industrial production index; (2) growth in consumer durables, nondurables, and services; and (3) a dummy variable for recessions. The sentiment index, referred to as Sentiment, is defined as the first principal component of the correlation matrix of the six orthogonalized sentiment proxies. We use the same sentiment measure for our analyses. As in Baker and Wurgler (2006) , we also scale the index so that it has a unit variance. Table 2 reports the annual values of all the sentiment proxies and the sentiment index calculated using the orthogonalized sentiment proxies, from 1962 to 2003. As Table 2 and Figure 1 indicate, the sentiment index is positive for the years 1968 to 1970 , 1972 , 1979 to 1987 , 1996 to 1997 , and 1999 . Baker and Wurgler (2006 point out that both positive and negative investor sentiment years coincide with the anecdotal history of investor sentiment.
Results

Investor Sentiment and the Mispricing of Accruals
To test whether for small stocks accruals mispricing is greater in high sentiment years then in low sentiment years, we estimate the following model: Lagpdnd is lagged value-weighted dividend premium as defined in Baker and Wurgler (2006) . nipo is IPO volume. lagripo is the lagged first-day returns of IPOs. cef is closed-end fund discount. share is the equity share in new issues. lagldturn is the lagged natural log of NYSE turnover, detrended using past five-year average. Sentiment is the first principal component of the six sentiment proxies that have been orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic variables. We scale the sentiment index so that it has a 0 mean and a unit variance.
Eret itþ1 is stock return in excess of market return for month t þ 1.
3 Total Accruals it is total accruals (defined earlier) for the fiscal year that ended at least four month before but less than sixteen month before the return measurement month. This requirement relates future returns to the most recently reported accruals, but allows four months after the firm's fiscal year-end for the market to become informed about the accruals. Note that financial reports are typically released three to four months after the end of the fiscal year.
DSmall it is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for small stocks and zero otherwise. We classify our sample stocks as large and small at the beginning of each month t, using median market capitalization as the cutoff point. Book to Market it is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. Book value of equity is for the fiscal year that ended at least four months
FIGURE 1 Investor Sentiment Index
This is a plot of the sentiment index proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Sentiment index is defined in Table 2 . Sample period is 1962 to 2003.
3. Market-adjusted return models have been used in previous studies (e.g., Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu [2001] ). Some studies use beta as an explanatory variable in the model. However, data requirement to compute beta leads to a 10 percent reduction in our sample, mainly because of the loss of small stocks. Given that small stocks are most affected by investor sentiment, we decide not to include beta in our main analysis. However, we repeat our analysis after including beta and our conclusions do not change, although the results related to the effect of sentiment are slightly weaker.
before, but less than sixteen month before the return measurement month. Market value of equity is for the most recent calendar year-end. Book to Market it ratio is included to capture any associated risk or mispricing effects. PriorRet it is cumulative stock return in months between t-7 and t-1 and is included to capture any momentum related risk or mispricing effects.
Finally, Sentiment t in eq. (2) is the investor sentiment measure, which was defined in Section 2). In the spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2006) , sentiment measure for the most recent calendar year before the fourth month after the fiscal year-end month is used to capture the sentiment of investors at the time they price the reported accruals of a company. The explanatory variable in our crosssectional regressions of monthly returns (eq. (1)) includes accruals from firms with different fiscal year-ends. These fiscal year-ends may be a few to several months before the return measurement month. Thus, the sentiment measure that corresponds to the accruals mispricing estimated by a monthly return regression may be either for the most recent calendar year before the return month or for the calendar year before that. Consequently, in eq. (2), we regress the estimated value of average accruals mispricing of small stocks relative to large stocks for a month (b 5t ) against the average value of the sentiment measures for the two most recent calendar years.
Finally, the dependent variable in our regression model is monthly returns as against annual returns used in Sloan (1996) . Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggest using monthly returns in a context like ours for the following reasons. First, asset pricing models assume normally distributed returns and normality is a better approximation for monthly returns than annual returns, where skewness becomes important. Second, the asset-pricing models specified in the literature are incomplete and the bad-model problems are unavoidable. Moreover, these problems are more serious in longer return models. In fact, recent studies on accruals anomaly use monthly returns models (Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh [2006] ; Teoh and Zhang [2006] ).
We predict that the slope coefficient on Sentiment t in eq. (2) is negative. A negative coefficient is consistent with overvaluation per unit of accruals is greater for small stocks when investor sentiment is higher.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of eq. (1). The coefficients of Book to Market it and PriorRet it variables are positive and significant, consistent with the results in prior studies. The coefficient of Total Accruals it is negative and significant, consistent with prior studies and suggesting the presence of the accruals mispricing in our sample. The coefficient on DSmall x Total Accruals is negative but insignificant. This result suggests that, on average, there is not much difference in accruals mispricing between small and large stocks, a finding that is consistent with that of Fama and French (2007) . We predict, however, that the coefficient on DSmall x Total Accruals is negatively correlated with investor sentiment.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the regression results of eq. (2), where the dependent variable is the time series of the estimated coefficient of DSmall it x 
(1).
ERet itþ1 is stock return in excess of market return for month tþ1. Total Accruals it is defined in Table 1 . DSmall it is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when market capitalization at the beginning of a month is below the median for the month, and is zero otherwise.
Book-to-Market it ratio is measured as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. PriorRet it is cumulative stock returns between months t-7 and t-1. In Panel B, we report the regression estimates of eq. (2), where the dependent variable, b 5t , is the incremental mispricing per unit of accruals of small firms relative to large firms, obtained from Fama-MacBeth regressions of eq. (1).
Panel C reports the regression estimates of eq. (3), where the dependent variable, b 2t , is the accruals mispricing of large firms, obtained from Fama-MacBeth regressions of eq. (1).
Sentiment t is the investor sentiment measure, which is obtained from Baker and Wurgler (2006) , and is defined in Table 2 .
The p-values of the time-series regressions of eqs. (1) and (2) Total Accruals it (b 5t ) from eq. (1). The regression coefficient on Sentiment t is negative and significant, À1.210 (p-value ¼ 0.03), suggesting that the incremental mispricing per unit of accruals of small stocks relative to large stocks is negatively related to sentiment measures, which is consistent with our prediction.
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In untabulated results, we also find that the average value of estimated b 5t corresponding to the positive values of sentiment measures is significantly greater (t ¼ 2.34) than the average value of estimated b 5t corresponding to the negative values of sentiment measures. This result provides further support to our prediction that accruals mispricing of small stocks is greater when investor sentiment is higher.
We predict a significant relation between the accruals mispricing of small stocks and investor sentiment and find results consistent with the prediction. However, an insignificant relation between the accruals mispricing of large stocks and investor sentiment would further validate this prediction. To examine whether the accruals mispricing per unit of accruals for large stocks is related to investor sentiment, we estimate the following equation:
where, b 2t represents mispricing per unit of accruals of large stocks and is estimated using eq. (1). Panel C of Table 3 shows that the coefficient on Sentiment t (d 1 ) is insignificant (p-value ¼ 0.233). This result further suggests that the accruals mispricing is related to investor sentiment only for small firms.
We repeat the above analysis after replacing Total Accruals it with Current Accruals it . Table 4 reports the results for the models with Current Accruals it and are generally consistent with those we obtain for Total Accruals it . The main result of interest in Table 4 is in Panel B. The coefficient on Sentiment t has a negative and significant coefficient, À1.092 (p-value ¼ 0.07). This result further supports our prediction that, for small stocks, mispricing per unit of accruals is greater in high sentiment years.
We also repeat our analysis after using the accruals measure from the statement of cash flows. Collins and Hribar (2002) argue that this is a more accurate measure of accruals. These data are available only for years 1987 onward. Nevertheless, the results (not tabulated) are consistent with our prediction that mispricing per unit of accruals for small stocks is greater in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. Table 1 . DSmall it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when market capitalization at the beginning of a month is below the median for the month, and is 0 otherwise.
Book-to-Market it ratio is measured as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. PriorRet it is cumulative stock returns between months t-7 and t-1.
In Panel B, we report the regression estimates of eq. (2), where the dependent variable, b 5t , is the incremental mispricing per unit of accruals of small firms relative to large firms, obtained from Fama-MacBeth regressions of eq. (1).
Panel C reports the regression estimates of eq. (3), where the dependent variable, b 2t , is the mispricing per unit of accruals of large firms, obtained from Fama-MacBeth regressions of eq. (1).
The p-values of the time series regressions of eqs. (1) and (2) 
Investor Sentiment and Accruals Management
We estimate the following model to examine the relation between the level of accruals and investor sentiment.
Eq. (4) is similar to the model used by Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) , with the following exceptions. First, our dependent variable is Total Accruals it and their dependent variable is discretionary accruals suggested by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) . We do not use discretionary accruals because it is based on the estimated residuals of annual cross-sectional regression of an accruals model (e.g., the Jones [1991] model). By construction, the mean value of the residuals is zero for every year. Use of such a discretionary accruals measure would prevent us from examining the relation between our annual sentiment measures and accruals management. Thus, we use Total Accruals it as the dependent variable.
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Another difference between eq. (4) and the model used by Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) is that we add investor sentiment-related variables in the model. Specifically, we add Sentiment t , DSmall it , and Sentiment t Â DSmall it to the model. A positive coefficient on Sentiment t Â DSmall it would indicate that for small stocks accruals are higher in high sentiment years as compared with low sentiment years.
The other variables in eq. (4) control for other factors that influence accruals. L1Accruals it is last year's total accruals scaled by the beginning of year total assets. This variable captures the reversal of accruals over time. MA it is one if the firm has engaged in a merger and acquisition, and zero otherwise. FINAN-CING it is one if MA it is not equal to one and the number of outstanding shares increased by at least 10 percent, or long-term debts increased at least 20 percent, or the firm first appears on the CRSP monthly returns database during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. LITIGATION it is one if the firm operates in a highlitigation industry, and zero otherwise; LEVERAGE it is the ratio of total debt to total assets at the beginning of the fiscal period; MB it is market-to-book ratio; LOSS it is one if the firm reports a net loss for the fiscal period, and zero otherwise; CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of year total 5. We also consider adding the following two variables to eq. (4) to control for nondiscretionary accruals: (1) change in revenue deflated by total assets and (2) property, plant, and equipment deflated by total assets. By using the pooled data to estimate this model, however, we constrain the coefficients on these two variables to be same across years and industry. Hence, these variables may not provide an effective control for nondiscretionary accruals. In any case, we estimate the model and the results do not change our conclusions. Table 1 . DSmall is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for small stocks, and zero otherwise. We classify our sample stocks as large and small at the beginning of each month t, using median market capitalization as the cutoff point.
Sentiment is the investor sentiment measure, which is obtained from Baker and Wurgler (2006) , and is defined in Table 2 . LITotal Accruals it (L1Current Accruals it ) is last year's total (current) accruals scaled by the beginning of year total assets.
MA is one if the firm has engaged in a merger and acquisition, and zero otherwise. FINANCING is one if MA is not equal to one and the number of outstanding shares increase by at least 10 percent, or long-term debts increase at least 20 percent, or the firm first appears on the CRSP monthly returns database during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
LITIGATION is one if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets at the beginning of the fiscal period. MB is market-to-book ratio (inverse of book-to-market ratio). LOSS is one if the firm reports a net loss for the fiscal period, and zero otherwise. CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets. Industry (not reported) is a dummy variable for industry membership based on twelve industry groups of Fama and French (1997) .
Huber/White Robust two-tailed p-values (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered by both time and firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Sample period is 1962 to 2004.
assets; and Industry it is a dummy variable for industry membership. We use the twelve industry groups in Fama and French (1997) . We estimate eq. (4) using the pooled time-series and cross-sectional data. The regression error terms are likely to be correlated across firms and across time. To address this issue, we follow the Thompson (2007) and Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006) methodology and estimate standard errors clustered both by firm and year. Table 5 presents the regression estimates of eq. (4). For both the total accruals and the current accruals models, the coefficient on DSmall it Â Sentiment t is positive and significant (p-values of 0.04 and 0.02 for total accruals and current accruals, respectively). This result is consistent with the notion that accruals are higher for small stocks in high sentiment years as compared with low sentiment years. Moreover, it suggests that company managers of small stocks exploit investors' greater overvaluation per unit of accruals in high sentiment years by reporting higher accruals in those years.
We also estimate eq. (4) after using the accruals measure from the statement of cash flows (Collins and Hribar [2002] ). These data are available for years 1987 onwards. The results (not tabulated) are consistent with our conclusion that for small firms accruals are higher in high sentiment years.
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of investor sentiment on the accruals anomaly. We find that for small stocks the negative relationship between accruals and future returns is more pronounced for accruals reported during high sentiment periods. This finding is consistent with the notion that in high sentiment periods individual investors pay less attention toward understanding the cash and accruals components of earnings. This effect is observed only for small stocks because these stocks are more likely to be followed by individual investors, who tend to have limited attention. We also find that for small stocks, reported accruals are greater during high sentiment years compared with low sentiment years. This result suggests that managers exploit the greater overvaluation per unit of accruals during high sentiment periods by shifting accruals to those periods.
